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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STArfE OF UTAH

WESTERN CONTRACTING CORPORATION, a . . corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant.

\.

~:
No.

10322

)

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an original proceeding pursuant to Section
Utah Code Annotated 1953 for review of
a decision of the State Tax Commission approving a
deficiency assessment in plaintiff-taxpayer's corporation
franchise tax for the calendar year 1962.

59-13-46

1

DISPOSITION BY STATE TAX
COMMISSION
The Tax Commission, on the basis of a stipulation
of facts, exhibits, and memoranda submitted by counsel
for plaintiff and the Commission, approved a deficiency
assessment as proposed by the Commission's auditin~·
division. The effect of the approval was to apply a
"segregated accounting method" in such a way that
plaintiff's tax assessment was based upon a "constructive" income that greatly exceeded its total net income
for the year in question.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Tax
Commission and remand of the case to the Commission
with directions that it assess plaintiff's franchise tax
in such a manner that (I) the taxable income will not
exceed the net income, and ( 2) the assessment will not
exceed an amount based upon allocation to Utah of
"the proportion of net income fairly and equitably at·
tributable to the state."
STATEM.ENT OF FACTS
'Vestern Contracting Corporation, plaintiff, is an
Iowa corporation which, since its incorporation in 1~17.
has had its principal place of business in Sioux City,
Iowa. It has been qualified to do business in Utah and
has filed Utah tax returns since August 8, 1955.
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1

!

In 1958, plaintiff commenced a stripping contract
for Kennecott Copper Corporation in Bingham Canyon, Gtah. A second stage of the stripping contract was
commenced in 1960, and completed in 1961. Income
from a third stage, commenced in 1961 and completed
in 1962, is the subject of this proceeding.
During 1962, the company also engaged in major
constructing activities such as bridge construction,
dredging, and stripping in the states of Louisiana,
New Jersey, PennsylYania, California, Iowa, 'Visconsin, and South Dakota.
In compliance with the provisions of subsection 4
of Regulation 8, Corporation Franchise Tax Act, issued
by the State Tax Commission, and dealing with exceptions to the statutory method of allocation of net income,
the plaintiff filed its Utah franchise tax return for
calendar 1962 using the segregated accounting method,
and allocated equivalent federal income taxes of $905,443.46 against the net income before federal income
taxes allocated to Utah by this method ($1,741,237.43),
resulting in net income for Utah corporation franchise
tax purposes of $835, 793. 97. Plaintiff has regularly
filed its federal income tax returns using the "completed
contract" basis of accounting and has used the same
method of accounting for filing its Utah state franchise
tax returns. The auditing division has proposed au
additional assessment of franchise taxes for calendar
1962 in the amount of $32,913.39 plus interest, based
primarily on the disallowance of a substantial portion
of the claimed deduction for federal income taxes.
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Plaintiff reported in 1962 net income before federal
income taxes of $555,088.31, and paid federal income
taxes of $183,215.11, resulting in total net income from
operations in that year of $371,873.20. The proposed
assessment would create net income assignable to Utah
of $1,626,985.92. Details of the gross receipts, deductions, and elements of the allocation factors and specific
allocation items set forth in the statutory formula are
itemized in the Stipulation of Facts found on pages 9
through 15 of the Transcript of Record.
ARGUMENT

I
INCOME ALLOCATED TO UTAH FOR
CORPORATION FRANCHISE TAX PURPOSES MAY NOT EXCEED THE TOTAL
NET INCOME OF THE CORPORATION.
Section 59-13-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953 pro·
vides for a corporation franchise tax as follows:
" ... equal to 4 per cent of its net income for
the preceding taxable year computed an? allo·
cated to this state in the manner heremafter
provided, or I/20 of l p~r cent of the fair val~e
during the next precedmg taxable year of 1~s
tangible property in this state, whichever is
greater; but in no case shall the tax be less than
$10." (Emphasis added.)
For corporations doing business in more than one
state, 59-13-20 provides for the determination of net

4

income in the state of Utah for the purpose of establishing the basis for the imposition of the franchise tax.
"The portion of net income assignable to business <lone within this state, and which shall be
the basis and measure of the tax imposed by this
chapter, may be determined by an allocation
upon the basis of the following rules: ... "
After certain specific allocations of interest, dividends, and gains from the sale or exchange of capital
assets, subsection 5 of section 59-13-20 provides:
"If the bank or other corporation carries on
no business outside this state, the whole of the
remainder of net income may be allocated to this
state."

Subsection 6 sets forth the basic allocation formula
whereby income from a multi-state corporation is to
be allocated to the individual states. In these quotations,
the words "net income" are used repeatedly, indicating
the intent of the legislature that the franchise tax is to
be based on the net income of the corporation and that
specialized rules in apportioning or allocating such
income where necessary still deal with the same basic
concept.
It is not necessary to look outside the statute to
find the meaning of "net income." Section 59-13-6
defines it:

"Net income" means the gross income computed under section 59- 13-5, less the deductions
allowed by section 59-13-7."
5

Gross income is defined in section 59-13-5, with certa[1
items excluded from gross income for purposes of tht
franchise tax computation. Similarly, section 59-13·1
sets forth specified deductions from gross income in
computing net income. Not all expenses of busines1
operations are deductions from gross income as defineu
in the Utah statutes. In applying these various den·
nition statutes, including particular items of gro.1>
income and deducting specific items from gross income,
we derive a statutory concept of "net income" whid1
in turn is the basis for the application of the corporate
franchise tax and for the allocation of income for cor·
porations doing business in more than one state. Any
allocation of income or tax on income is limited to the
amount of such income derived pursuant to the statute.
Even subsection 8 of section 59-13-20, which gives the
Tax Commission power to allocate to the state of Utah
income of the taxpayer apart from the general appor·
tionment statute, provides:
"If in the judgment of the Tax Commission
the application of the foregoi~g rules <l~es not
allocate to this state a proport10n of net income
fairly and equitably attributable to this state,
it may with such information as it may be able
to obtain make such allocation as is fairly cal·
culated to assign to this state the portio~ of
income reasonablv attributable to the business
done within this ~tate and to avoid subjectin~
the taxpayer to double taxation." (Emphasis
added.)
The intent of the legislature is clear: the corporate
" t .
e" as
franchise tax is to be based upon ne mcom
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<lefine<l in the statute, subject to the minimum taxes and
an alternative tax based upon tangible property in the
state. Any method of allocation derived by the Commission under its powers in subsection 8 of section 5913-:W or in its regulations interpreting this section are
subject to the overall limitation of net income. To hold
otherwise would subject some "gross" income to tax
rather than "net" income as required.
Plaintiff's net income after federal income taxes
for the calendar year 1962 amounted to $371,872.20.
In accordance with the regulations of the State Tax
Commission, plaintiff reported its income in Utah for
the year using segregated accounting and after making
sume allocation assumptions concerning this income, at
$835,793.97. This reported amount exceeds 200 per
cent of the total net income of plaintiff for the calendar
year 1962. The proposed deficiency assessment by the
State Tax Commission assigns net income in the amount
of $1,626,985.92 to business done in Utah, an amount
which exceeds four times the total net income reported
by the corporation for the year. The effect of the proposed allocation used by the State Tax Commission
is to depart from the allocation of net income as defined
in the statute, and instead to allocate gross income
found in Utah after the deduction of only specified
deductions in Utah.
This Court, in the case of New Park Mining Compan/J v. State Ta.r Cornmission, 113 Utah 410, 196
P.2d 485 ( 1948), in an attempt to interpret the allowanee for depletion, held:

7

. "Mining corporations must deduct federal
mcome and excess profit taxes, before calculat.
ing. the ~epletion ~llowance to which they are
entitled m computmg their corporate franchise
taxes under a statute proYiding that allowance
for depletion shall be one-third of 'net income'
from property during the taxable year."
This depletion deduction is authorized specifically in
section 59-13-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which
provides for this deduction for depletion pursuant to
rules and regulations prescribed by the State Tax
Commission. Regulation No. 12 of the State Tax Com·
mission sets forth the rule for the depletion deduction,
and establishes an alternative deduction based on cost
or "33 I/3 per cent of the net income of the taxpayer
from the property during the taxable year computed
without allowance for depletion." The same regulation
later defines net income as follows:
"Net income from the property must be com·
puted by deducting from gross income from t~e
property all deductions allowed by statute m •
computing taxable net income (excluding the !
allowance for depletion) to the extent that ~h~y '
are applicable to the property. The reqw~1te
deduction shall include overhead and operatmg
expenses, development costs to extent claimed ,
or allowed as a deduction on the return, depre·
ciation, taxes, including federal income taxes, '
losses sustained, etc."
It is clear, therefore, that both the Tax Commission
and the legislature have dec1"d ed t hat t he t erm "net
income" as used in certain of the sections of the chapter

8

dealing with corporate franchise taxes refers to defined
"net income"-gross income from items taxable in Utah
less specified deductions.
This term has also been defined in many cases m
many jurisdictions. The following are typical:
"A tax may be imposed only upon 'net income' which is defined as the gross income of
the taxpayer, less the deductions and exemptions
allowed by law.'' 1rlorlcy v. Remmel, 221 S.,V.
2d 51; 215 Ark. 434.
"Net income, or earnings, are the products of
a business, deducting the expenses only." Jones
& Nimick Mfy. Co. v. Commonwealth, 69 Pa.
137.

"Net income means profit, and profit is derived, in any business in which capital is lost
or depleted, only after the expenses of conducting the business are paid, and return is made
of the capital inwsted which is gone.'' Carter v.
Phillips, 212 Pac. 747, 88 Okla. 202 (1923).
"Necessarily, net income for tax purposes
is a conception of the income tax statute, and
amount arrived at is ascertained by deducting
from gross amount of income received by taxpayer from all sources, the specified deductions
allowed to it by statute, even though for corporate purposes only, net income may be arrived
at by the deduction of entries and accounts not
perr~issible for tax a ti on pnrposes." American
Can Co. v. Bowers, 35 F.2d 832 (1929).
"The words 'net income' being used in their
common and usual meaning mean the income
remainin u after the deduction of all charges,

"'
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outlay, loss, etc." People e.l' rel. Standard Oil
Company of New York 'l'. Law, 200 N.Y.S. 72
205 App. Div. 531.
.
"The state legislature in taxing net income
cannot exclude as deductions from gross income
such i~ems as. ordin~ry and necessary expenses
?f domg busmess, mcluding salaries, rentals,
mterest, losses, and bad debts." Cook v. Walters
Dry Goods Co., 206 S.,i\T.2d 742, 212 Ark. 485.
An attempt by the State Tax Commission to tax
more than net income of the corporation, as being
properly allocable to Utah, violates the commerce clause,
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Federal Consti·
tution. In the case of Gwin, White & Prince v. Henne·
ford, 305 U.S. 434, 83 L.Ed. 272, 59 S.Ct. 325 (1938),
the United States Supreme Court in interpreting a
state tax said:
"The present tax, though nominally local,
thus in its practical operation discriminates
against interstate commerce, since it imposes
upon it, merely because interstate commerce is
being done, the risk of a multiple burden to whic.h
local commerce is not exposed." (Emphasis
added.)
In that case, the court said that the application of the
statute discriminated against interstate commerce. The
same would appear to be true in the case of the Utah
Corporation Franchise Tax Act. If the State Tax
Commission interprets it in such a way that a company
doing business in interstate commerce can be forced to
pay a greater tax under that interpretation of the Act

10

than a corporation doing business solely within the State
of Utah, the taxing statute discriminates against interstate commerce. Such a result is obvious in the case in
point. If plaintiff were a Utah corporation, it would
pay tax only on its total net income. It is inequitable
to require plaintiff to pay tax under the Utah Franchise
Tax provisions on any amount in excess of net income
simply because the corporation is doing business in interstate commerce.
In a Pennsylvania case where the starting point
for allocation is net income, not as determined by state
statute, but as returned to and ascertained by the federal
government, a company had an overall net loss on its
federal return, but it had a net gain in Pennsylvania.
In denying the Commonwealth the authority to tax
gain, the court said:
"\Ve are unable to comprehend how a net loss
can be construed as net income. The tax is
levied on each dollar of net income, not on each
dollar of net loss. If we are correct in this hypothesis, there is no net income as defined ... to be
allocated and apportioned . . . in which event
no tax is due for the period involved."
The court went on to say:
"The Act imposes no tax on a net loss, and
when there is a net loss there is no net income
to be allocated or apportioned." Commonwealth
v. Columbia Steel & Shafting Co., 83 D & C 326,
62 Dauph l (Pa. Common Pleas, 1952).
\\There a legislature has intended a different result,
the statute has clearly said so. For example, in the
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case of Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Galloway, 175
Ore. 524, 154 P.2d 539 ( 1944), the Oregon Supreme
Court said in connection with this question:
"Is it essential that a corporation which does
business both within and without this state ...
had a net over-all income before the defendants
are authorized to assess against it the corporatiou
excise tax ... or will it suffice if the corporation's
Oregon business yielded a net income; . . ."
In answering this question, the court said:
"Manifestly, when the legislature wrote our
statute, it could have embraced either the propo·
sition submitted by the plaintiffs or the one for
which the defendants contend1 that is, it could
have made the Act provide that no corporation
doing business both within and without Oregon
should be liable for a tax unless its total opera·
tions resulted in a net income; or it could have
provided that all corporations should be subject
to the tax if their Oregon business yielded a net
return regardless of the results achieved in other
states. Obviously, one or the other proposition
was embraced by the legislature. A choice was
necessarily made. In determining which was
chosen, we must of course look to the statute.
llence, the first of the two issues calls for nothing
more than statutory construction."
The court then analyzed the statutory provisions and
decided that the Oregon tax base was net income from
within Oregon. The most pertinent statutory words
were found to be:
"The determination of net income shall b~
based upon the business done within the state.

12

The Utah statute does not define net income for Utah
franchise tax purposes in the same way that the Oregon
statute defined it for Oregon purposes. Rather, our
statute clearly indicates that the net income of the taxpayer everywhere is to be assig11able to business done
within the state, based on a statutory formula, subject
to a modification of that statutory formula in unusual
cases, but still dealing with "the portion of net income"
as a limiting factor.
It follows that the maximum amount of net income
that could be allocated to Utah under any formula
devised by the State Tax Commission in the event
that the statutory formula does not equitably allocate
the correct amount of income to Utah, is $371,873.20,
the total net income of plaintiff for the calendar year
1962. Any holding to the contrary is in direct conflict
with the terms of the statute, the normal meaning of
the term net income, and the requirement of the statute
that the taxpayer is not to be subjected to double
taxation.

II
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO USE THE
STATUTORY ALLOCATION FORMULA IN
CALCULATING THE AMOUNT OF INCOME
SUBJECT TO TAX IN THE STATE OF
UTAH.
Section 59-13-20 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953
sets forth the procedure to be followed in determining

13

the net income allocated to the State of Utah. This
section begins :
"The portion of net income assignable to busi·
ness d~ne within this state, and which shall be
the basis and measure of the tax imposed by this
chapter, may be determined by an allocation
upon the basis of the following rules: ... " (Em.
phasis added.)
·
Following subsections provide for the specific alloca·
tion of certain items such as interest, dividends, and
gains from the sale or exchange of a ca pita} asset. Sub·
section 6 sets forth the allocation formula to be used
for taxpayers doing business in more than one state,
as follows:
" ( 6) If the bank or other corporation carries
on any business outside this state, the said re·
mainder may be divided into three equal parts:
" (a) Of one third, such portion shall be al·
tributed to business carried on within this state
as shall be found by multiplying said third by
a fraction whose numerator is the value of the
corporation's tangible property situated within
this state and whose denominator is the value of
all the corporation's tangible property wherever
situated.
" ( b) Of another third, such portion shall ~i
attributed to business carried on within this
state as shall be found by multiplying said thir!
by a fraction whose numerator is the total amo~n
expended by the corporation for ~ages, s.alar1e1
commissions or other compensation to its err
ployees and assignable to this .state and whm
denominator is the total expenditures of the co
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poration for wages, salaries, comrmss10ns, or
other compensation to all of its employees.
" ( c) Of the remaining third, such portion
shall be attributed to business carried on within
th~s state as sh.all be found by multiplying said
third by a fraction whose numerator is the amount
of the corporation's gross receipts from business
assignable to this state, and whose denominator
is the amount of the corporation's gross receipts
from all its business.
" ( d) The amount assignable to this state of
expenditures of the corporation for wages, salaries, commissions or other compensation to its
employees shall be such expenditures for the taxable year as represent the compensation of
employees not chiefly situated at, connected with
or sent out from, premises for the transaction of
business owned or rented by the corporation
outside this state.
" ( e) The amount of the corporation's gross
receipts from business assignable to this state
shall be the amount of its gross receipts for the
taxable year from
" (1st) Sales, except those negotiated or
effected in behalf of the corporation by agents
or agencies chiefly situated at, connected with
or sent out from premises for the transaction
of business owned or rented by the corporation
outside this state, and sales otherwise determined
by the tax commission to be attri?utable to the
business conducted on such premises,
" (2nd) Rentals or royalties from P.ro_perty situated, or from the use of patents, w1thm
this state.
"(f) The value of the corporation's tangible
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property for the purpose of this section shall
be the average value of such property during the
taxable year."
Subsection 8 of this statute provides:
"If in the judgment of the tax commission
the application of the foregoing rules does not
allocate to this state the proportion of net income
fairly and equitably attributable to this state
it may with such information as it may be ab!~
to obtain make such allocation as is fairly calcu·
lated to assign to this state the portion of net
income reasonably attributable to the business
done within this state and to avoid subjecting
the taxpayer to double taxation."

The legislature must have intended the allocation
formula, combined with the specific allocations of par·
ticular items, to be the normal method by which multi·
state corporations would pay a tax to the State of
Utah on a proportionate share of their income. It is
only in the event that the application of the general
formula does not allocate to this state the proportion
of net income fairly and equitably attributable to the
state that the Tax Commission has the power to depart
from the formula.
This Court has considered this subsection in two
cases germane to our discussion. Justice "\Volfe, con·
curring in part and dissenting in part, in the case ~f
California Packing Corporation v. State Tax Commis·
sion, 97 Utah 367, 93 P .2d 463 ( 1939), made the follow·
ing statement:

16

"The very reading of subsection 8 precludes
any o~her constructio~1 (referring to the departure from the allocation rules when that is required to be fair to either the state or the taxpayer). In determining the portion of net income
assignable to business done within this state, the
Commission 'may' use a rule set out in the main
opinion. This does not mean that the Commission
may ignore the rules and choose its own. 'May'
has the meaning of 'r.;hould,' i.e., should fallow
the rules unless the rules fail to accomplish the
overarching purpose as revealed by subsectiou
8. It is only in case an application of the rules
as laid down fails to allocate to this state the
proportion of net income fairly and equitably
attributable to this state, or on the other hand,
where the rules would subject the taxpayer to
so-called double taxation that the Commission
may depart from them."
The same approach was used in the case of Kennecott Copper Company, et al. v. State 1'ax Commission,
118 Utah 140, 221 P.2d 857 ( 1950), in which Justice
Pratt made the following comment:

"'¥ e have decided that the Commission 'should'
follow the legislative formula, unless it fails to
accomplish the purpose of the formula. '¥ith
such a foundation upon which to act, neither the
Commission nor this court should reject the formula because of the laborious t~k possihly attendent upon its (lpplicatiu11." (Emphasis added.)
Thus it is clear that the legislature intended that,
except in most unuusal cases, the statutory formula
set forth in subsections 1 through 7, inclusiYe, should
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be applied, and that consistent with such legislativ,
intent this court has held that subsection 8 should bi
applied only in most unusual cases.
The Court has gone further and said that eve11
if subsection 8 is applied, any formula so devised mus!
be equitable to the taxpayer and to all others similarlr
situated. A taxpayer conducting a unitary business such
as this plaintiff, operating in several states, should be
subject to tax only on a reasonably allocable portion
of such income in any of the individual states. The
statutory formula was designed to accomplish this
purpose.
The Commission, pursuant to the authority of
subsection 8, has adopted Regulation No. 8. Subsection
4 of that Regulation reads as follows:
"Exceptions to statutory method. It is the
policy of the Tax Commission, based upon court
interpretations of the statute, to require that the
1nethod set forth in the statute be used for th.e
assignment of net income within and without thu
state." (Emphasis added.)
This subsection of the Regulation goes on to outline
the Tax Commission's authority to modify this statutory
formula and pursuant to this power makes the following
prov1s1on:

"The segregated accounting. n_iethod is g~~
erally required in the case of mmmg c~mpame d
contractors ranch and farm corporations, a~
may be re~uired in the case of certain financ1a1

18

ins~itutions or other corporations upon audit and
review of the returns filed, if necessary to produce
a reasonable result."

The intent of the legislature in using the statutory
formula to determine the amount of income that should
be assigned to Utah where corporations are "doing
business" both in and outside Utah, is set forth by the
Commission in the same subsection 4 of Regulation 8:
"There is a strong presumption that the applicatiun of the statutory method of assigning
net income will produce a reasonable allocation
of net income within and without this state, and
it must be used in all cases except those in which
the Tax Commission has determined that an
exception should be made. It should be emphasized that the statutory method may produce an
income assignment substantially different _from
that produced by some other method (such as
segregated accounting), but that fact alone is
not sufficient to justify an exception. It must
be shown that the factors of the formula when
applied to the particular business at hand could
not be expected to produce a reasonable allocation because of a variance from normal situations
with respect to property, wages, and salaries,
receipts, rents, interests, dividends, etc., sufficient to invalidate the assumption of a reasonable
allocation.''
There is no reason why the formula should not be
applied to determine the amount of income assignable
to Utah from its operations in Utah. The application
of the formula does fairly and equitably apportion net
income to Utah, and the burden of proof in overcoming
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the presumption is not met by the Commission when
it arbitrarily holds that contractors must depart from
the formula.
The problem of taxing income from multi-state
operations is a complicated one. All states have recognized this problem, and have developed apportiorunent
formulas in order to tax the income from these cor·
porations so that they would bear a fair share of the cost
of government in the various states in which they did
business. A substantial majority of these states hare
adopted a three-factor apportionment formula similar
to the one set forth in the Utah statute. The states of
California, Idaho, Arizona, and Oregon have adopted
a formula using substantially the same three factors
to determine the amount of net income properly assign·
able to an individual state from these multi-state cor·
porations. In the application of these allocation formulas
it has become important to determine whether the
business of the multi-state corporation is unitary or
nonunitary in nature, in that the statutory allocation
formulas are generally applicable to the unitary type
business, whereas the nonunitary businesses lend them·
selves appropriately to allocation by the use of separate
accounting methods. The Utah State Tax Commission
has apparently decided that contractors and certain
other types of businesses are "nonunitary" in nature
and therefore should file their returns on the basis of
separate accounting.
Plaintiff carries on a unitary type business, even
though many of the activities necessary in the perform·
20

ance of the particular contract in question were performed entirely within the state of Utah. The factors
supporting this contention are as follows:
Plaintiff's only permanent office is in Sioux City,
Iowa. Temporary offices are opened in connection with
each major project at the job sites. The executive,
administrative, and financial offices of the corporation
are in Sioux City. There the President and other principal officers have their offices, the Board of Directors
regularly holds its meetings, and all of the general
company personnel, including the chief engineer, the
chief accountant, and managers of the various departments (such as highway construction, heavy construction, marine construction, special projects, materials
production, and equipment) are located.
Plaintiff hires people on a permanent basis from
the Sioux City area, including project managers, project accountants, project engineers, construction superintendents, and master mechanics. These employees
move from project to project and sometimes are transferred before a project is completed. The only people
hired by plaintiff at a project are laborers and some
clerical help.
Plaintiff's property and equipment are maintained
in Sioux City. Equipment is purchased by the manager
of the equipment department and is transferred from
job to job. When a project is commenced, the project
manager is given a control list of suppliers by the
executive personnel from whom he can acquire major
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items to be used at the project. Repair parts and minor
supplies are purchased locally. Major purchases, such
as dynamite, for many of the construction jobs are made
or specifically approved at the offices in Sioux City.
Each project maintains a separate set of books for
that project and prepares and forwards to the home
office weekly and monthly reports. The project payroll
is prepared at the job site. Depreciation and overhead
costs are a pp lied to the monthly and weekly reports in
Sioux City, and the financial statements of the cor·
poration are prepared at the general accounting offices.
All receipts from the various projects are processed
through Sioux City. The banking functions are all
handled by the home office. Payroll checks are prepared
locally and signed locally. All invoices are matched
against purchase orders at the individual project offices,
where the checks in payment of those invoices are
prepared. These checks, together with the approved
invoices, are forwarded to the main off ices of the com·
pany, where they are signed by the chief accountant.
The chief accountant periodically transfers money to
the local bank accounts from the general account of
the company in order to cover the local payroll checks i
on each project.
All permanent records in connection with the payrolls on the individual projects are maintained in Sioux
City and the quarterly payroll reports to the variou)
governmental organizations are prepared there.
A permanent staff of approximately forty-five
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persons is maintained at the Sioux City offices. The
individual project managers are called there regularly
to review progress on individual jobs. All bidding,
major supply purchasing, and equipment purchases are
handled from the head office. All important decisions
in connection with the individual projects, including
modifications on these projects, are cleared with Sioux
City. The functions handled by the individual project
managers could be classified as ministerial in nature,
with all of the managerial functions performed by personnel at the headquarters of the company.
Plaintiff contends, based on the above factors, that
it is unitary in nature and therefore the allocation formula should be applied to its total net income for the
purpose of determining the fair and equitable portion
of such net income that should be taxed in the state of
Utah.
The United States Supreme Court in interpreting
a statute that is very similar to the Utah statute clearly
set forth the rule in connection with the use of an
apportionment formula. In Butler Bros v. McColgan,
315 U.S. 501, 86 L.Ed. 991, 62 S.Ct. 701 (1942), the
court said, quoting from Hans Rees Sons v. North
Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 75 L.Ed. 904, 51 S.Ct. 385
(1931) :

"The enterprise of a corporation which mam~
factures and sells its manufactured products is
ordinarily a unitary busines~ and all the ~act?rs
in that enterprise are essential to the realization
of profUs." ( Enwhasis added.)
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The court went on to say that by the same token, the
~tate of California could treat the appellant's business
m that case as a unitary one, and justified its ruling on
the following factors:
, "The:re is ~nity of ownership and management.
The operation of the central buying division
alone demonstrates that functionally the various
branches are closely integrated."
In that case, the appellant operated branch wholesale
distributing houses in several states, including one at
San Francisco, California. Each of these branches
maintained a stock of goods, served a separate terri·
tory, had its own sales force, handled its own sales,
and all solicitations, credit and collection arrangements
in connection therewith, and kept its own books of
account. All the purchases made for the various whole·
sale distributing houses were made through a central
buying division, the goods ordered being shipped by the
manufacturer directly to the houses for which they
were ordered. The cost of the goods and the transpor·
tation charges were entered on the books of the house
which received the goods. No charges were made against
that particular house for the benefit of any of the houses
by reason of the centralized purchasing. The actual
cost of operating the centralized buying division was
allocated among the houses. The greater part of the
appellant's other operating expenses was incurred
directly and exclusively at the respective houses. Cer·
tain items benefiting all of the distributing houses were
paid by the appellant and allocated to them. Included
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in such expenses were executive salaries, certain accounting expenses, the cost of operating the central buying
division, and the central advertising division. Except
for these common expenses, each house was operated
independently of each other house. The California
house, keeping its books using generally accepted accounting principles, and after allocation of common
expenses, reported a loss of approximately $82,000,
while the total profit for all of the houses was approximately $1,150,000. The court continued:
"We cannot say that property, payroll, and
sales are inappropriate ingredients of an apportionment formula. \Ve agree with the Supreme
Court of California that these factors may properly be deemed to reflect 'the relative contribution of the activities in the various states to the
production of the total unitary income' so as to
allocate to California its just proportion of the
profits earned by appellant from his unitary
business."
Similar factors were used in Crawford Mfg. Co. v.
State Commission of Revenite and Taxation, 180 Kan.
352, 304 P.2d 504 (1956), wherein the Supreme Court
of Kansas held:
"A multi-state business is a unitary business
for income tax purposes when the operations
conducted in one state benefit and are benefited
by the operations conducted in a~other state or
states. If its various parts are mterdependent
and of mutual benefit so as to form one integral
business rather than seyeral business entities, it
1s unitary.
25

"The essential _test to be applied is whether
or not .t11~ operat10n <:>f the portion of the busi·
n~ss w1t1m the state is dependent upon or contributory to the operation of the business outsid
the s~ate. ~f there is such relationship, the busi~
ness is unitary."

1

The functions performed by the management and
general off ice personnel of plaintiff are considerably
more involved than those in the Butler Bros. case, supr~.
and it appears therefore that under the factors con·
sidered by the U. S. Supreme Court, plaintiff's opera·
tion is clearly a unitary business, and that therefore the
formula for determining the portion of income allocable
to Utah should be followed in this case. All of the
activities of the corporation, both within and without
the state of Utah, contributed to the realization of
profits by the corporation.
III
THE STATE TAX CO.MMISSION ERRED
IN REFUSING TO ALLO'V THE DEDUC·
TION OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXES ON A
SEPARATE ACCOUNTING BASIS.
In the event this Court finds that the net income
limitation is inapplicable to the operations of plaint.iff
in Utah for the calendar year 1962, and that the plam·
10
tiff is not entitled to use the statutory formula
determine the amount of income to be allocated to Ut~h.
and further decides that the petitioner must file ,its
returns using the separate or segregated accounting

,
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method, a deduction for federal income taxes computed
on an equivalent basis is a part of such segregated
accounting.
Segregated accounting means that the taxpayer is
keeping a separate set of records for the determination
of net income from business done within a particular
division of a business. This means that the taxpayer
accounts for gross revenues and deductions on an individual state or unit basis rather than by total amounts
for the operations of the company. Separate accounting is ordinarily appropriate for businesses of a nonunitary nature and has been applied to an oil business
doing all production, manufacturing and refining outside the taxing state, particularly where local sales outlets were charged at the market price of products
received from the outside producers and refiners, to
disconnected railroad lines in different states and to
world-wide operations.
The purpose of independent unit, or segregated
accounting is not to raise additional revenue but to
prevent the imposition of an unconstitutional tax;
separate accounting (particularly without legislative
sanction) cannot be forced on a taxpayer without his
consent. Ordinarily, separate accounting is claimed by
certain taxpayers in order to prevent taxing a disproportionate part of income regardless of the type
of company or income, if not geared or related to taxable privilege or incident.
This is just contrary to the situation with plaintiff
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m this case. The plaintiff's gross profit arising from
its contract operations in Utah exceeded its gross profits
in other states. If the Commission has power to force
contractors to file their returns using a segregated
accounting method, this indicates that the Commission
wants a separate determination of the amount of income
earned in U tab. The logical result of such a determi·
nation is that all income and expenses directly attribut·
able to Utah should be accounted for in Utah, and those
costs that are general throughout the company should
be allocated to Utah on some reasonable basis. The
basis of allocation used by the plaintiff is not in question
in this proceeding with the exception that the amount
of the deduction for federal income taxes deducted by
plaintiff is in conflict with Regulation No. 13 issued
by the State Tax Commission. In that regulation, the
Commission takes the position that it does not recognize
for Utah Corporation Franchise Tax purposes the
so-called "tax savings" resulting from loss items. "Red
figure" allocations of federal income taxes are not ac·
cepted. Loss items or divisions must not be assigned
any federal income tax either positive or negative. In
effect, the Commission is saying that only those items
that produce a profit should have any federal income
tax deduction allocated against them, and that those
items that produce a loss have no effect on federal
income taxes. This result is absurd. Federal income
taxes are paid on the basis of the net income of th_e
·
taxpaying unit, not on t he net mcome
of any ind1·
. · · or
vidual components of that unit. Those d ms1ons
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portions of the unit that have a loss for the period
have the effect of reducing the taxes paid by the profitmaking divisions of the taxpaying unit. To say that
only the divisions of the taxpaying unit that contribute
a profit to the organization affected the federal income
tax in any given taxable period is simply not in agreement with the facts of the taxing statute. Regulation
No. 13 therefore is contrary to a proper determination
of net income using the segregated accounting method
and is not consistent with the Commission's express
desire to use segregated accounting in connection with
contractors.
The use of segregated accounting means that all
income and expense items should be specifically determined for the particular business done in the State
of Utah, and this should logically result in a separate
determination of federal income taxes for that particular unit. Federal income taxes are the single most
expensive item of cost that most businesses incur, and
to say that net income can be determined by using a
federal income tax deduction which has been reduced
because of losses in other states has the effect of taxing
only "net income before federal income taxes" earned
in the State of Utah pursuant to the segregated accounting method.
Section 59-13-7, subsection 3, provides specifically,
"Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable year" are
deductions in the determination of net income. It is
an accepted accounting procedure to use the so-called
29

"red figure" method of determining federal income
taxes where apportionments are necessary between
departments, divisions, or operating units of a particular taxpayer. The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, in its Accounting Research Bulletin
No. 43, pages 87 to 92,deals with this subject as it relates
to the proper allocation of income tax to a corporation
that is deducting for tax purposes accelerated depreciation or amortization, or where there is any other substantial difference between income per books and income per
tax return. The Institute position in this matter is
that the financial statements of any given period should
show as a deduction the income tax properly paid,
based upon generally accepted accounting principles,
without regard to the amount actually set up as the
tax liability based on the tax returns filed. The most
popular elementary accounting textbook, Finney &
Miller's Sixth Edition, in its chapter on departmental
operations, page 369, clearly indicates that a department that has a loss should have a negative tax figure
assigned to it for the purpose of determining the true
net income or loss from that particular department.
All accountants who prepare certified financial state·
ments use the theory of tax allocation in making adjustments for taxes where the statements based on good
accounting principles differ from the statements filed
for tax purposes. Either a prepaid tax account or a
tax liability account is set up to account for the difference between the amounts paid to the taxing authorities
and the amount properly accrued based upon the re· ,
1

1
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portable income of a company for other than tax purposes.
·'Segregated" means 1Jegregated, and it is not
within the authority of the Tax Commission in its
allocation of net income, '·as is fairly calculated to
assign to this state the portion of net income reasonably
attributable to the business done within this state and
to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation,"
for it to attempt to force the determination of gross
income and specific expenses in Utah using the segregated accounting method and then rely upon the total
federal income taxes paid by the corporation based on
its total operations for the purpose of determining the
amount of the deduction for federal income taxes. If
the Commission wants a separate determination of net
income in Utah, then the amount deductible for federal
income taxes in Utah should be the amount based upon
the income before taxes determined separately in the
State of Utah rather than the amount of taxes paid
based on the total net income, including loss operations
in other operating divisions of the company.
The calculation of the amount of such taxes is a
relatively simple matter. The net income before taxes
allocated to U tab is simply multiplied by the applicable
tax rates of the federal income tax law for the year in
question. The plaintiff filed its return on this basis and
deducted federal taxes of $905,443.46. The Tax Commission seems to be in a position of saying, "Since you
had more net income in the state of Utah than for the
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total operations of the company, we will depart from
the allocation formula, but because the losses in other
states contributed to a reduction in federal income taxes
we will limit your deduction for federal income tax
purposes to the amount paid on net income after deducting those losses."
Even the Commission appears to recognize the
necessity of matching income within the state of Utah,
that created federal income tax, against such taxes,
when it finds in its conclusion of law, No. 4:
"The taxpayer is entitled to deduct no more
than the portion of federal taxes paid which
pertains or relates to income from its Utah oper·
ations against its Utah income for Utah franchise
tax purposes." (Emphasis added.)
The amount of federal taxes pertaining or relating to
income from Utah operations is substantially in excess
of the total federal taxes paid based on net income from
operations in all states. If the Tax Commission can
base the tax on a "constructive net income," it should
have no difficulty in determining a "constructive"
federal tax on that income.

IV
THE PURPORTED C 0 NT RAC 'f OR
AGREEl\!IENT TO FILE UTAH CORPORA·
TION FRANCHISE TAX RETURNS USING
THE SEGREGATED ACCOUNTING METH·
OD IS NOT BINDING UPON PLAINTIFF.
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Methods of accounting and the accounting periods
to be followed by franchise taxpayers are set forth in
5H3-15 Utah Code Annotated 1953:
"'fhe net income shall be computed upon the
basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting period
(fiscal year or calendar year, as the case may be)
and in accordance with the method of accounting
regularly employed in keeping the books of said
taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting
has been so employed, or if the method employed
does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made in accordance with such
method as in the opinion of the tax commission
does clearly reflect the income."
The Tax Commission is authorized, if at all, to require
a taxpayer to enter into an agreement by which taxpayer gives up some rights in order for the taxpayer
to receive permission to use its regular method of
accounting employed on its books, only when such
method of accounting does not clearly reflect the income
of the taxpayer. This burden of showing that such
method does not clearly reflect income is on the Tax
Commission and would be extremely difficult to sustain
in that the federal tax regulations and generally accepted accounting principles both permit the use of
the completed contract method of accounting as an
accepted method. See Accounting Research Bulletin,
No. 45, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (October, 1955).
The Tax Commission's use of such an agreement
(pages 17 and 18 of the Transcript of Record) is based
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upon its concern that a contractor reporting 011 th
completed contract method might complete a contrac
in Utah and withdraw from Utah without paying an1
corporation franchise tax on the amount of net inco~1
earned on such contract. The agreement requires, there
fore, that if taxpayer reports its income on the com
pleted contract basis it agrees to waive the statute 0
limitations and agrees to certain other covenants ir
consideration of the Tax Commission's agreement tr
accept the filing of corporation franchise tax return
using the completed contract method of accounting
Such agreement recites that the Commission require~
the filing of corpora ti on franchise tax returns usini
the accrual or percentage of contract completion basis
and a separate accounting basis. The Tax Commissior
does not have the authority to require the use of thi~
accrual or percentage of completion method of account
ing, and it is questionable whether it has the authoriti
to require the use of separate accounting by a taxpayer
whose regularly employed accounting method "clear!)
reflects the income" of the taxpayer. Plaintiff signei
the purported agreement on October 25, 1962, under
the assumption that such an agreement was within tht
power of the Tax Commission and with the desire tc
comply with the rules and regulations set forth by
such Tax Commission. The agreement provides thal
plaintiff would report all income received or earnea
as a result of its operations in Utah on its corporation
franchise tax returns. The agreement did not conunil
the plaintiff to file its returns using the separate method
34

of accounting. The comment "all income derived from
its Utah contracts completed while it is qualified as
a corporation in Utah," however, does indicate that
the Commission intended the separate accounting
method to apply here. Plaintiff contends that the contract is not binding in that the State Tax Commission
does not have the power to enter into this type of an
agreement and that there was no consideration for the
agreement because the plaintiff was entitled to file its
returns using the method of accounting consistently
employed by it without the Commission's per1mss1on.
"Unless there is ratification by the State,
the State is not bound by a contract made by its
agents without authority conferred on them by
statute or by the Constitution." 81 C.J.S.,
States, p. 1087.
This statement appears to set forth the general rule in
connection with the powers of officers of a state. Such
officers have only the powers expressly granted to them
by statute, and there appears to be no express authority
in the Utah statutes authorizing the Commission to
enter into the type of agreement involved in this case.
Certain commissions functioning as part of the state
government have been given specific power. In Campbell Building Company v. State Road Commission,
95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937), this court said:
"The statute empowers the State Road Commission to bind the state by written contracts
and it is only on such written 'contract that it may
be sued. The state cannot be held for the acts of
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its engineer beyond the powers conferred by
law or the written contract."
Interpreting the powers of the State Tax Commission,
this court said in Logan City v. Allen, 86 Utah 375, 44
P.2d 1085 (1935):
"As a general rule, the taxing officers of the
state, county, or municipal corporation, may not
compromise or release claims for taxes legally
assessed unless empowered to do so by statute."
The statute setting forth the general powers and
duties of the Tax Commission, 59-5-46 Utah Code
Annotated 1953, authorizes the Commission to pre·
scribe regulations and rules, and to exercise supervision
over the administration of the tax laws. In this connection, the Commission is to exercise all powers necessary in the performance of its duties, but there is
nothing which expressly authorizes the Commission to
make contracts with taxpayers concerning their method
of accounting or modifying the statutory requirements
in connection with the filing of Utah corporation fran·
chise tax returns. If the use of the completed contract
accounting method were not a generally accepted method
of accounting, or if such method did not clearly reflect
the income of the taxpayer, it is possible that the Com·
sion's power might include entering into an agreement
to accept the method of accounting used by the tax·
payer in consideration of the taxpayer agreeing to
certain conditions prescribed by the Commission. Even
conceding such power, the particular agreement in
question is void for lack of consideration in that the
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Commission covenanted only to accept the filing of
corporation franchise tax returns on a completed contract basis, which method was within the express provisions of the statute. The Commission's permission to
use an accounting method in lieu of a method it could
not force the use of is not consideration and the contract
is therefore void and of no effect, and does not preclude
the taxpayer from asserting its rights to file its tax
return under a method differing from that of the separate accounting method implied in the agreement.
The contract is also void in that it is against public
policy to deprive a taxpayer of the express right to
judicial review on the question of the reasonableness
of the accounting system which the taxpayer is required
to use. Section 59-13-46, Utah Code Annotated 1953
provides for review by this court of decisions of the
State Tax Commission on questions involving the franchise tax. Encompassed within this right to judicial
review would be the determination of the reasonableness
of the accounting method and the Commission should
not be able to restrict the scope of review by contracts
purporting to bind the taxpayer to a particular method
of accounting.

CONCLUSION
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
State Tax Commission of Utah are clearly erroneous
to the extent they hold that plaintiff does not conduct
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a unitary business, and that any allocation of net incom:
to Utah for corporation franchise tax purposes is 110:
limited to the total net income of the plaintiff frut~
its total operations. To the extent that separate account
ing is a valid method of determining net income allo
cated to Utah, "equivalent" federal income taxes a11
a proper deduction in establishing such net income a:
a basis for franchise taxes.

The State Tax Commission has failed to establisr
the necessity of departing from the statutory allocatio1
formula so plaintiff is entitled to use this formula i1
determining its net income properly allocable to Utal
for franchise tax purposes.

In the alternative, if this court finds that departur1
from the statutory allocation formula is justified, plain
tiff cannot be taxed on any amount exceeding its overal
net income from its operations within and without th1
state.

Further in the alternative, if allocated net incom1
can exceed total net income of the plaintiff, a deductior
for federal income taxes on an "equivalent" basis i1
required for a correct separate accounting determinatior
of net income.

The deficiency assessed by the State Tax Commis·
sion should be cancelled and this case remanded to thi
Commission for determination of franchise taxes du1
pursuant to the opinion of the Court.
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